Vivian M. van Breemen
- 2 August 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2837Details
- Abstract
- We empirically investigated the impact of regulatory risk retention methods on credit ratings and pricing at issuance using a sample of European securitization tranches issued in the period 2011-2021. European regulation is based on the assumption that all risk retention methods homogenously align incentives and interests between originators and investors. We investigated the impact of these methods on the pricing of securitization tranches and found that investors adjust the risk premium at issuance for tranches based on different risk retention methods. We also found that credit ratings (discrepancy) differed depending on the risk retention method used. Finally, we gained a deeper insight into the risk retention methods chosen over time and concluded that originators take deal complexity and capital relief characteristics into consideration when selecting a specific method.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 29 July 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2691Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of intensified competition on rating quality in the credit rating market for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the period 2017-2020. We provide evidence that competition between large credit rating agencies (CRAs) (Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) and newer smaller ones (Dominion Bond Rating Service Morningstar and Kroll Bond Rating Agency) creates credit rating inconsistencies in the RMBS market. While a credit rating should solely represent the underlying credit risk of a RMBS, irrespective of the competition in the market, our results show that this is not the case. When competitive pressure increases, both large and small CRAs tend to adjust their rating standards (smaller CRAs react to large CRAs and vice versa).
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation