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Research Task Force on monetary policy, macroprudential policy and financial stability (RTF)
Purpose
The Research Task Force was launched in December 2017 by the Research Coordination Committee of the ECB with the objective to foster cooperation across the ECB to produce new frameworks of analysis for key research and policy questions on the interaction of monetary policy, macroprudential policy and financial stability.
Main research topics
The RTF conducts research over a three-year period in the following areas:
- impact of macroprudential policy
- interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies
- monetary policy effects on financial stability risk
Summary of results and policy implications
Research Bulletin No. 92 - Monetary and macroprudential policies: trade-offs and interactions
Working Paper 2647 - Monetary policy, macroprudential policy and financial stability
Organisation
- Chair
- Luc Laeven (ECB)
- Coordinators
- External academic advisers
-
- Professor Markus K. Brunnermeier, Princeton University
- Professor Anil Kashyap, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
- Professor Mark Gertler, New York University
- Contact
- ResearchTaskForce@ecb.europa.eu
Conferences
- 22-23 March 2021
- ECB-RFS Macro-Finance Conference
- 16-17 December 2019
- ECB macroprudential policy and research conference
- 17-18 December 2018
- Research workshop on monetary policy and financial stability
Policy papers and research papers
- 24 February 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2647Details
- Abstract
- Recent research developed under the ECB research task force on Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability highlights the existence of trade-offs and spillovers that monetary policy and macroprudential authorities face when deciding on their policy interventions. Monetary policy measures are key to support the supply of credit to the economy, but they could also have unintended consequences on financial stability risks. Macroprudential policies are instead effective in limiting financial stability risks, but they could also reduce the length of economic expansions by preventing credit from flowing to productive economic activities. In addition, since monetary and macroprudential policies transmit to the broad economy via the financial system, they unavoidably affect each other’s effectiveness. Taking these factors into account is key for the design and implementation of both policies.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 25 November 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2615Details
- Abstract
- To what extent can Quantitative Easing impact productivity growth? We document a strong and heterogeneous response of corporate R&D investment to changes in debt financing conditions induced by corporate debt purchases under the ECB’s Corporate Sector Purchase Program. Companies eligible for the program increase significantly their investment in R&D, relative to similar ineligible companies operating in the same country and sector. The evidence further suggests that by subsidizing the cost of debt, corporate bond purchases by the central bank stimulate innovation through a wealth transfer to innovative companies with low debt levels, rather than by supporting credit constrained firms.
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
O3 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 6 October 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2598Details
- Abstract
- We study the transmission of (unconventional) monetary policy to the real sector when firm decisions depend on both current and future credit market conditions. For a given level of current credit access, investment and employment increases more at firms expecting bank credit to improve in the future. Three separate unconventional policies by the ECB—the OMT, the introduction of negative rates, and the CSPP—improved expectations of future credit access for SMEs borrowing from banks that were expected to increase SME lending due to the policy. Our results enhance our understanding of the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 1 October 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2593Details
- Abstract
- This paper develops a simple analytical framework to study the impact of central bank policy-rate changes on banks’ credit supply and risk-taking incentives. Unobservable expost bank monitoring of loans creates an external-financing constraint, which determines bank leverage. Unobservable, costly ex-ante screening of borrowers determines the level of bank risk-taking. More risk-taking tightens the external-financing constraint. The policy rate affects the external-financing constraint because it affects both the return on outside investors’ alternative investments and loan rates. In a low rate environment, a policy-rate cut reduces bank funding costs less because of a zero lower bound (ZLB) on retail deposit rates. Bank risk-taking is a necessary but not sufficient for a policy-rate cut to become contractionary ("reversal"). Reversal can occur even though banks’ net-interest margins increase. Credit market competition plays an important role for the interplay of monetary policy and financing stability. When banks have market power, a policy-rate cut can increase lending and still lead to risk-taking. We use our analytical framework to discuss the literature on how monetary policy affects the credit supply of banks, with special emphasis on low and negative rates.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 2 June 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2565Details
- Abstract
- Macro-prudential authorities need to assess medium-term downside risks to the real economy, caused by severe financial shocks. Before activating policy measures, they also need to consider their short-term negative impact. This gives rise to a risk management problem, an inter-temporal trade-off between expected growth and downside risk. Predictive distributions are estimated with structural quantile vector autoregressive models that relate economic growth to measures of financial stress and the financial cycle. An empirical study with euro area and U.S. data shows how to construct indicators of macro-prudential policy stance and to assess when interventions may be beneficial.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 31 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2561Details
- Abstract
- We decompose euro area sovereign bond yields into five distinct components: i) expected future short-term risk-free rates and a term premium, ii) default risk premium, iii) redenomination risk premium, iv) liquidity risk premium, and a v) segmentation (convenience) premium. Identification is achieved by considering sovereign bond yields jointly with other rates, including sovereign credit default swap spreads with and without redenomination as a credit event feature. We apply our framework to study the impact of European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy and European Union (E.U.) fiscal policy announcements during the Covid-19 pandemic recession. We find that both monetary and fiscal policy announcements had a pronounced effect on yields, mostly through default, redenomination, and segmentation premia. While the ECB's unconventional monetary policy announcements benefited some (vulnerable) countries more than others, owing to unprecedented flexibility in implementing bond purchases, the E.U.’s fiscal policy announcements lowered yields more uniformly.
- JEL Code
- C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 18 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2553Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents evidence that personal relationships between corporate borrowers and bank loan officers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiation. Analysing a bank reorganization in Greece in the mid-2010s, I find that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship confront three consequences: one, the firms are less likely to renegotiate their loans; two, conditional on renegotiation, the firms are given tougher loan terms; and three, the firms are more likely to alter their capital structure. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers in loan renegotiations.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 12 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2548Details
- Abstract
- We investigate asset returns around banking crises in 44 advanced and emerging economies from 1960 to 2018. In contrast to the view that buying assets during banking crises is a profitable long-run strategy, we find returns of equity and other asset classes generally underperform after banking crises. While prices are depressed during crises and partially recover after acute stress ends, consistent with theories of fire sales and intermediary-based asset pricing, we argue that investors do not fully anticipate the consequences of debt overhang, which result in lower long-run dividends. Our results on bank stock underperformance suggest that government-funded bank recapitalizations can often lead to substantial taxpayer losses.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G41 : Financial Economics - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 23 April 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2539Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effects of imperfect risk-sharing between lenders and borrowers on commercial property prices and leverage. The key friction is that agents use different discount rates to evaluate future flows. Eliminating this pecuniary externality generates large reductions in the volatility of real estate prices and credit. Therefore, policies that enhance risk-sharing between lenders and borrowers reduce the magnitude of boom-bust cycles in real estate prices. We also introduce health shocks to study the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on the commercial property market.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
E23 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Production - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 8 February 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2521Details
- Abstract
- We show that a reduction in lender of last resort (LOLR) policy uncertainty positively affects bank lending and propagates to investment and employment. We exploit a unique policy that reduced uncertainty regarding the availability of future LOLR funding for banks as a quasi-natural experiment. Using micro-level data on banks, firms and loans in Portugal, we generate cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposure to uncertainty and find that the size of the haircut subsidy - the gap between private market and central bank security valuations - plays a key role in the propagation of the shock to lending and the real economy.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 16 December 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2504Details
- Abstract
- We document that there are strong complementarities between monetary policy and macroprudential policy in shaping the evolution of bank credit. We use a unique loan-level dataset comprising multiple credit registers from several European countries and different types of loans, including corporate loans, mortgages and consumer credit. We merge this rich information with borrower and bank-level characteristics and with indicators summarising macroprudential and monetary policy actions. We find that monetary policy easing increases both bank lending and lending to riskier borrowers, especially when there is a more accommodative macroprudential environment. These effects are stronger for less capitalised banks. Results apply to both household and firm lending, but they are stronger for consumer and corporate loans than for mortgages. Finally, for firms, the overall increase in bank lending induced by an accommodative policy mix is stronger for more (ex ante) productive firms than firms with high ex ante credit risk, except for banks with low capital.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 11 December 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2498Details
- Abstract
- I study macro-prudential policy intervention in economies with secularly low interest rates. Intervention boosts risk-free real interest rates unintentionally, simply as a by-product of containing systemic risk in financial markets. Thus, intervention also boosts the natural rate of return in particular (i.e., the equilibrium risk-free rate that is consistent with inflation on target and production at full capacity). These results point to a novel complementarity between financial stability and macroeconomic stabilization. Complementary is sufficiently strong to generate a divine coincidence if the natural rate is secularly low, but not too low.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 30 November 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2497Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of macroprudential capital buffers on banking groups' lending and risk-taking decisions, also investigating implications for internal capital markets. For identification, we exploit heterogeneity in buffers applied to other systemically important institutions, using information from three unique confidential datasets, including information on the EBA scoring process. This policy design induces a randomized experiment in the neighborhood of the threshold, which we use to identify the effect of higher capital requirements by comparing the change in the outcome for banks just above and below the cut-off, before and after the introduction of the buffer. The analysis is implemented relying on a fuzzy regression discontinuity and on a difference-in-differences matching design. We find that, when parent banks are constrained with higher buffers, subsidiaries deleverage lending and risk-taking towards non-financial corporations and marginally expanded lending towards households, with negative effects on profitability. Also, we find that parents cut down on holdings of debt and equity issued by their subsidiaries. Our findings support the hypothesis that higher capital buffers have a positive disciplinary effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having a (temporary) adverse impact on the real economy through a decrease in affiliated banks' lending activity. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, it is essential that policymakers assess their potential cross-border effects.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 9 October 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2480Details
- Abstract
- We quantify the impact that central bank refinancing operations and funding facilities had at reducing the banking sector’s intrinsic fragility in the euro area in 2014-2019. We do so by constructing, estimating and calibrating a micro-structural model of imperfect competition in the banking sector that allows for runs in the form of multiple equilibria, in the spirit of Diamond & Dybvig (1983), banks’ default and contagion, and central bank funding. Our framework incorporates demand and supply for insured and uninsured deposits, and for loans to firms and households, as well as borrowers’ default. The estimation and the calibration are based on confidential granular data for the euro area banking sector, including information on the amount of deposits covered by the deposit guarantee scheme and the borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB). We document that the quantitative relevance of non-fundamental risk is potentially large in the euro area banking sector, as witnessed by the presence of alternative equilibria with run-type features, but also that central bank interventions exerted a crucial role in containing fundamental as well as non-fundamental risk. Our counterfactuals show that 1 percentage point reduction (increase) in the ECB lending rate of its refinancing operations reduces (increases) the median of banks’ default risk across equilibria by around 50%, with substantial heterogeneity of this pass-through across time, banks and countries.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L13 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 7 October 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2479Details
- Abstract
- This paper uses granular data on syndicated loans to analyse the impact of international reforms for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on bank lending behaviour. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find no effect of the reforms on overall credit supply, while at the same time documenting a substantial decline in borrower- and loan-specific risk factors for the affected banks. Moreover, we detect a significant decline in the pricing gap between interest rates charged by G-SIBs and other banks, which we interpret as indirect evidence for a reduction in funding cost subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the G-SIB reforms have helped to mitigate moral hazard problems associated with systemically important banks, while the consequences for the real economy have been limited.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 17 July 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2444Details
- Abstract
- We contrast how monetary policy affects intangible relative to tangible investment. We document that the stock prices of firms with more intangible assets react less to monetary policy shocks, as identified from Fed Funds futures movements around FOMC announcements. Consistent with the stock price results, instrumental variable local projections confirm that the total investment in firms with more intangible assets responds less to monetary policy, and that intangible investment responds less to monetary policy compared to tangible investment. We identify two mechanisms behind these results. First, firms with intangible assets use less collateral, and therefore respond less to the credit channel of monetary policy. Second, intangible assets have higher depreciation rates, so interest rate changes affect their user cost of capital relatively less.
- JEL Code
- E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 26 June 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2429Details
- Abstract
- We study the composition of bank loan portfolios during the transition of the real sector to a knowledge economy where firms increasingly use intangible capital. Exploiting heterogeneity in bank exposure to the compositional shift from tangible to intangible capital, we show that exposed banks curtail commercial lending and reallocate lending to other assets, such as mortgages. We estimate that the substantial growth in intangible capital since the mid-1980s explains around 30% of the secular decline in the share of commercial lending in banks' loan portfolios. We provide suggestive evidence that this reallocation increased the riskiness of banks' mortgage lending.
- JEL Code
- E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 15 June 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2421Details
- Abstract
- We study state dependence in the impact of monetary policy shocks over the leverage cycle for a panel of 10 euro area countries. We use a Bayesian Threshold Panel SVAR with regime classifications based on credit and house prices cycles. We find that monetary policy shocks trigger a smaller response of GDP, but a larger response of inflation during low states of the cycle. The shift in the inflation-output trade-off may result from higher macro-economic uncertainty in low leverage states. For an alternative regime classification based on turning points we find larger effects on GDP during contractions.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 13 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2407Details
- Abstract
- This paper estimates and compares the international transmission of European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve System monetary policy in a unified and methodologically consistent framework. It identifies pure monetary policy shocks by purging them of the bias stemming from contemporaneous central bank information effects. The results suggest that there is a hierarchy in the global spillovers from ECB and Federal Reserve monetary policy: while the spillovers to consumer prices are relatively small in both directions, Federal Reserve monetary policy shocks have a larger impact on euro area financial markets and real activity. Federal Reserve monetary policy also has a significantly larger impact than ECB monetary policy on real and financial variables in the rest of the world.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 13 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2406Details
- Abstract
- Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 4 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2399Details
- Abstract
- We consider the effects of quantitative easing on liquidity and prices of bonds in a search-and matching model. The model explicitly distinguishes between demand and supply effects of central bank asset purchases. Both are shown to lead to a decline in yields, while they have opposite effects on market liquidity. This results in a price-liquidity trade-off. Initially, liquidity improves in reaction to central bank demand. As the central bank buys and holds bonds, supply becomes scarcer and other buyers are crowded out. As a result, liquidity can fall below initial levels. The magnitude of the effects depend on the presence of preferred habitat investors. In markets with a higher share of these investors, bonds are scarcer and central bank asset purchases lower yields more. With a lower share of preferred habitat investors and a relatively illiquid market, central bank demand has a stronger positive effect on liquidity. We are the first to construct an index from bond holding data to measure the prevalence of preferred habitat investors in each euro area country. Subsequently, we calibrate the model to the euro area and show how yields and liquidity are affected by the European Central Banks asset purchase programme.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 April 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2398Details
- Abstract
- We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach-for-yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private sector (financial and non-financial) securities and dollar-denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 21 April 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2397Details
- Abstract
- We study the effects of credit over the business cycle, distinguishing between expansions and contractions. We find that there is a growth and risk trade-off in the pace of credit growth over the business cycle. While rapid credit growth tends to be followed by deeper recessions, we also find that credit growth has a positive impact on the duration of expansions. This poses a trade-off for the policymaker: Limiting the buildup of financial risk to avoid a deep recession can negatively affect the cumulation of economic growth during the expansion. We show that intermediate levels of credit growth maximize long-term growth while limiting volatility. Macroprudential policies should be used to manage this growth and risk trade-off, striking a balance between allowing expansions to last longer and avoiding deep recessions.
- JEL Code
- C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 2 January 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2350Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the efficiency of various monetary policy instruments to stabilize asset prices in a liquidity crisis. We propose a macro-finance model featuring both traditional and shadow banks subject to funding risk. When banks are well capitalized, they have access to money markets and efficiently mitigate funding shocks. When aggregate bank capital is low, a vicious cycle arises between declining asset prices and funding risks. The central bank can partially counter these dynamics. Increasing the supply of reserves reduces liquidity risk in the traditional banking sector, but fails to reach the shadow banking sector. When the shadow banking sector is large, as in the US in 2008, the central bank can further stabilize asset prices by directly purchasing illiquid securities.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 2 January 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2349Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the effects of supranational versus national banking supervision on credit supply, and its interactions with monetary policy. For identification, we exploit: (i) a new, proprietary dataset based on 15 European credit registers; (ii) the institutional change leading to the centralisation of European banking supervision; (iii) high-frequency monetary policy surprises; (iv) differences across euro area countries, also vis-à-vis non-euro area countries. We show that supranational supervision reduces credit supply to firms with very high ex-ante and ex-post credit risk, while stimulating credit supply to firms without loan delinquencies. Moreover, the increased risk-sensitivity of credit supply driven by centralised supervision is stronger for banks operating in stressed countries. Exploiting heterogeneity across banks, we find that the mechanism driving the results is higher quantity and quality of human resources available to the supranational supervisor rather than changes in incentives due to the reallocation of supervisory responsibility to the new institution. Finally, there are crucial complementarities between supervision and monetary policy: centralised supervision offsets excessive bank risk-taking induced by a more accommodative monetary policy stance, but does not offset more productive risk-taking. Overall, we show that using multiple credit registers – first time in the literature – is crucial for external validity.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 18 November 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2330Details
- Abstract
- A quantile vector autoregressive (VAR) model, unlike standard VAR, models the interaction among the endogenous variables at any quantile. Forecasts of multivariate quantiles are obtained by factorizing the joint distribution in a recursive structure. VAR identification strategies that impose restrictions on the joint distribution can be readily extended to quantile VAR. The model is estimated using real and financial variables for the euro area. The dynamic properties of the system change across quantiles. This is relevant for stress testing exercises, whose goal is to forecast the tail behavior of the economy when hit by large financial and real shocks.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E17 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General Aggregative Models→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 23 August 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2311Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the effects of interbank rate uncertainty on lending rates to euro area firms. We introduce a novel measure of interbank rate uncertainty, computed as the cross-sectional dispersion in interbank market rates on overnight unsecured loans. Using proprietary bank-level data, we find that interbank rate uncertainty significantly raises lending rates on loans to firms, with a peak effect of around 100 basis points during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and the 2010-2012 European sovereign crisis. This effect is attenuated for banks with lower credit risk, sounder capital positions and greater access to central bank funding.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
D80 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 31 July 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2303Details
- Abstract
- Based on high frequency identification and other econometric tools, we find that monetary policy shocks had a significant impact on the health of euro area banks. Information effects, which made the private sector more pessimistic about future prospects of the economy and the profitability of the banking sector, were strongly present in the post-crisis period. We show that ECB communications at the press conference were crucial for the market response and that bank health benefitted from surprises, which steepened the yield curve. We find that the effects of monetary policy shocks on banks displayed some persistence. Other bank characteristics, in particular bank size, leverage and NPL ratios, amplified the impact of monetary policy shocks on banks. After the OMT announcement, we detect that the response of bank stocks to monetary policy shocks normalised. We discover that, in the post-crisis episode, Fed monetary policy shocks influenced euro area bank stock valuations.
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 28 June 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2292Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of higher bank capital buffers, namely of the Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII) buffer, on banks' lending and risk-taking behaviour. The O-SII buffer is a macroprudential policy aiming to increase banks' resilience. However, higher capital requirements associated with the policy may likely constrain lending. While this may be a desired effect of the policy, it could, at least in the short-term, pose costs for economic activity. Moreover, by changing the relative attractiveness of different asset classes, a higher capital requirement could also lead to risk-shifting and therefore promote the build-up (or deleverage) of banks' risk-taking. Since the end of 2015, national authorities, under the EBA framework, started to identify banks as O-SII and impose additional capital buffers. The identification of the O-SII is mainly based on a cutoff rule, ie. banks whose score is above a certain threshold are automatically designated as systemically important. This feature allows studying the effects of higher capital requirements by comparing banks whose score was close to the threshold. Relying on confidential granular supervisory data, between 2014 and 2017, we find that banks identified as O-SII reduced, in the short-term, their credit supply to households and financial sectors and shifted their lending to less risky counterparts within the non-financial corporations. In the medium-term, the impact on credit supply is defused and banks shift their lending to less risky counterparts within the financial and household sectors. Our findings suggest that the discontinuous policy change had limited effects on the overall supply of credit although we find evidence of a reduction in the credit supply at the inception of the macroprudential policy. This result supports the hypothesis that the implementation of the O-SII's framework could have a positive disciplining effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having only a reduced adverse impact
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 7 June 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2289Details
- Abstract
- Exploiting confidential data from the euro area, we show that sound banks pass on negative rates to their corporate depositors without experiencing a contraction in funding and that the degree of pass-through becomes stronger as policy rates move deeper into negative territory. The negative interest rate policy provides stimulus to the economy through firms’ asset rebalancing. Firms with high cash-holdings linked to banks charging negative rates increase their investment and decrease their cash-holdings to avoid the costs associated with negative rates. Overall, our results challenge the common view that conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective at the zero lower bound.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D25 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 24 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2286Details
- Abstract
- How far should capital requirements be raised in order to ensure a strong and resilient banking system without imposing undue costs on the real economy? Capital requirement increases make banks safer and are beneficial in the long run but also entail transition costs because their imposition reduces credit supply and aggregate demand on impact. In the baseline scenario of a quantitative macro-banking model, 25% of the long-run welfare gains are lost due to transitional costs. The strength of monetary policy accommodation and the degree of bank riskiness are key determinants of the trade-off between the short-run costs and long-run benefits from changes in capital requirements.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 23 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2285Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the cross-border propagation of prudential regulation in the euro area. Using the Prudential Instruments Database (Cerutti et al., 2017b) and a unique confidential database on balance sheets items of euro-area financial institutions we estimate panel models for 248 banks from 16 euro-area countries. We find that domestic banks reduce lending after the tightening of capital requirements in other countries, while they increase lending when loan-to-value (LTV) limits or reserve requirements are tightened abroad. We also find that foreign affiliates increase lending following the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers in the countries where their parent banks reside and that bank size and liquidity play a role in determining the magnitude of cross-border spillovers.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2284Details
- Abstract
- Prior to the financial crisis, prudential regulation in the EU was implemented non-uniformly across countries, as options and discretions allowed national authorities to apply a more favorable regulatory treatment. We exploit the national implementation of the CRD and derive a country measure of regulatory flexibility (for all banks in a country) and of supervisory discretion (on a case-by-case basis). Overall, we find that banks established in countries with a less stringent prudential framework were more likely to require public support during the crisis. We instrument some characteristics of bank balance sheets with these prudential indicators to investigate how they affect bank resilience. The share of non-interest income explained by the prudential environment is always associated with an increase in the likelihood of financial distress during the crisis. Prudential frameworks also explain banks’ liquidity buffers even in absence of a specific liquidity regulation, which points to possible spillovers across regulatory instruments.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 6 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2278Details
- Abstract
- This paper explores monetary-macroprudential policy interactions in a simple, calibrated New Keynesian model incorporating the possibility of a credit boom precipitating a financial crisis and a loss function reflecting financial stability considerations. Deploying the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) improves outcomes significantly relative to when interest rates are the only instrument. The instruments are typically substitutes, with monetary policy loosening when the CCyB tightens. We also examine when the instruments are complements and assess how different shocks, the effective lower bound for monetary policy, market-based finance and a risk-taking channel of monetary policy affect our results.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 29 March 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2260Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in the euro area by means of a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions and cross-border spillover effects. We calibrate the model for the four largest euro area countries (i.e. Germany, France, Italy, and Spain), with particular attention to the calibration of cross-country financial and trade linkages and country specific banking sector characteristics. We find that countercyclical macroprudential interventions are supportive of mon-etary policy conduct through the cycle. This complementarity is significantly reinforced when there are asymmetric financial cycles across the monetary union, which provides a case for targeted country-specific macroprudential policies to help alleviate the burden on monetary policy. At the same time, our findings point to the importance of taking into account cross-border spillover effects of macroprudential measures within the Monetary Union.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 18 March 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2249Details
- Abstract
- We assess how a major, unconventional central bank intervention, Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech, affected lending conditions. Similar to other large interventions, it responded to adverse financial and macroeconomic developments that also influenced the supply and demand for credit. We avoid such endogeneity concerns by focusing on a third country and comparing lending conditions by euro area and other banks to the same borrower. We show that the intervention reversed prior risk-taking – in volume, price, and loan credit ratings – by subsidiaries of euro area banks relative to local and other foreign banks. Our results document a new effect of large central banks’ interventions and are robust along many dimensions.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 18 February 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2243Details
- Abstract
- Do negative policy rates hinder banks’ transmission of monetary policy? To answer this question, we examine the behaviour of Italian mortgage lenders using a novel loan-level dataset. When policy rates turn negative, banks with higher ratios of retail overnight deposits to total assets charge more on new fixed rate mortgages. This suggests that the funding structure of banks may matter for the transmission of negative policy rates, especially for long-maturity illiquid assets. Nevertheless, the aggregate economic implications for households are small, suggesting that concerns about inefficient monetary policy transmission to households under modestly negative rates are likely overstated.
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 13 February 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2239Details
- Abstract
- Interbank money markets have been subject to substantial impairments in the recent decade, such as a decline in unsecured lending and substantial increases in haircuts on posted collateral. This paper seeks to understand the implications of these developments for the broader economy and monetary policy. To that end, we develop a novel general equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous banks, interbank markets for both secured and unsecured credit, and a central bank. The model features a number of occasionally binding constraints. The interactions between these constraints - in particular leverage and liquidity constraints - are key in determining macroeconomic outcomes. We find that both secured and unsecured money market frictions force banks to either divert resources into unproductive but liquid assets or to de-lever, which leads to less lending and output. If the liquidity constraint is very tight, the leverage constraint may turn slack. In this case, there are large declines in lending and output. We show how central bank policies which increase the size of the central bank balance sheet can attenuate this decline.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 7 February 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2237Details
- Abstract
- This paper contributes to the debate on the macroeconomic effectiveness of expansionary non-standard monetary policy measures in a regulated banking environment. Based on an estimated DSGE model, we explore the interactions between central bank asset purchases and bank capital-based financial policies (regulatory, supervisory or macroprudential) through its influence on bank risk-shifting motives. We find that weakly-capitalised banks display excessive risk-taking which reinforces the credit easing channel of central bank asset purchases, at the cost of higher bank default probability and risks to financial stability. In such a case, adequate bank capital demand through higher minimum capital requirements curtails the excessive credit origination and restores a more efficient propagation of central bank asset purchases. As supervisors can formulate further capital demands, uncertainty about the supervisory oversight provokes precautionary motives for banks. They build-up extra capital buffer attenuating non-standard monetary policy. Finally, in a weakly-capitalised banking system, countercyclical macroprudential policy attenuates banks risk-taking and dampens the excessive persistence of the non-standard monetary policy impulse. On the contrary, in a well-capitalised banking system, macroprudential policy should look through the effects of central bank asset purchases on bank capital position, as the costs in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation seem to outweigh the marginal financial stability benefits.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
F40 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→General - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 31 January 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2233Details
- Abstract
- We develop a dynamic structural model of bank behaviour that provides a microeconomic foundation for bank capital and liquidity structures and analyses the effects of changes in regulatory capital and liquidity requirements as well as their interaction. Our findings suggest that adjustments in both types of requirements can have an impact on loan supply, with considerable heterogeneity across banks and over time. The model illustrates that banks' reactions depend on initial balance sheet conditions and reconciles evidence on short-term reductions in loan supply with findings suggesting that better capitalized banks are better able to lend in the medium- to long-term.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 30 January 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2230Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides evidence on the strategic lending decisions made by banks facing a negative funding shock. Using bank-firm level credit data, we show that banks reallocate credit within their loan portfolio in at least three different ways. First, banks reallocate to sectors where they have a high market share. Second, they also reallocate to sectors in which they are more specialized. Third, they reallocate credit towards low-risk firms. These reallocation effects are economically large. A standard deviation increase in sector market share, sector specialization or firm soundness reduces the transmission of the funding shock to credit supply by 22, 8 and 10%, respectively.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 29 January 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2229Details
- Abstract
- We use a cross-country sample of monthly observations for quantitative easing (QE) treatments in order to study the causal effect of such policies on a large set of economic and financial outcome variables. We address potential endogeneity by re-randomising the sample and applying the augmented inverse probability weighting (AIPW) estimator. Our results show that QE policies do affect the central bank balance sheet and asset prices, in particular long term yields, equity prices and exchange rates in the expected direction. Most importantly, we find that QE policies lead to a sustained rise in the CPI and in inflation expectations. However, our findings suggest that the main transmission channel does not appear to be stronger aggregate demand impacting inflation through the Phillips curve, but rather exchange rate depreciation. Finally, we do not find any evidence for side effects and increases in risk taking following QE, with real house prices and real credit not increasing or falling, and no downward effect on stock market volatility.
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
F3 : International Economics→International Finance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 20 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2202Details
- Abstract
- Do borrowers demand less credit from banks with weak balance sheet positions? To answer this question we use novel bank-specific survey data matched with confidential balance sheet information on a large set of euro area banks. We find that, following a conventional monetary policy shock, bank balance sheet strength influences not only credit supply but also credit demand. The resilience of lenders plays an important role for firms when selecting whom to borrow from. We also assess the impact on credit origination of unconventional monetary policies using survey responses on the exposure of individual banks to quantitative easing and negative interest rate policies. We find that both policies do stimulate loan supply even after fully controlling for bank-specific demand, borrower quality, and balance sheet strength.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 15 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2199Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the effects of monetary policy on the equity values of European banks. We identify monetary policy shocks by looking at changes in the EONIA one-month and two-year swap contract rates during narrow windows around the press statements and press conferences announcing monetary policy actions taken by the ECB. We find that an unexpected decrease of 25 basis points on the short-term policy rate increases banks’ stock prices by about 1% on average. These effects vary substantially over time; in particular, they were stronger during the crisis period and reversed during the recent period with low and even negative interest rates. That is, with rates close to or below zero, further interest rate cuts became detrimental for banks’ equity values. The composition of banks’ balance sheets is important in order to understand these effects. In particular, the change in sensitivity to interest rate surprises as rates drop to low and negative levels is much more pronounced for banks with a high reliance on deposit funding, compared to other banks. We argue that this pattern can be explained by a reluctance of banks to pay negative interest rates on retail deposits.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 14 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2197Details
- Abstract
- We estimate the effects of quantitative easing (QE) measures by the ECB and the Federal Reserve on the US dollar-euro exchange rate at frequencies and horizons relevant for policymakers. To do so, we derive a theoretically-consistent local projection regression equation from the standard asset pricing formulation of exchange rate determination. We then proxy unobserved QE shocks by future changes in the relative size of central banks’ balance sheets, which we instrument with QE announcements in two-stage least squares regressions in order to account for their endogeneity. We find that QE measures have large and persistent effects on the exchange rate. For example, our estimates imply that the ECB’s APP program which raised the ECB’s balance sheet relative to that of the Federal Reserve by 35 percentage points between September 2014 and the end of 2016 depreciated the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar by a 12%. Regarding transmission channels, we find that a relative QE shock that expands the ECB’s balance sheet relative to that of the Federal Reserve depreciates the US dollar-euro exchange rate by reducing euro-dollar short-term money market rate differentials, by widening the cross-currency basis and by eliciting adjustments in currency risk premia. Changes in the expectations about the future monetary policy stance, reflecting the “signalling” channel of QE, also contribute to the exchange rate response to QE shocks.
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
F3 : International Economics→International Finance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 1 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2174Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effects of money supply shocks in a general equilibrium model that reproduces a term premium of the magnitude observed in the data. In an environment where financial frictions are the main source of monetary non-neutrality, I find that money supply shocks are less effective at stimulating inflation in recessions than in expansions. In terms of quantitative magnitude, the impact effect on inflation of a money supply shock is about half as large during recessions than during booms. This state dependence is essentially due to the time-variation in stochastic discounting that is needed to match the data.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 1 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2173Details
- Abstract
- We show that negative policy rates affect the supply of bank credit in a novel way. Banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, which increases the funding cost of high-deposit banks, and reduces their net worth, relative to low-deposit banks. As a consequence, the introduction of negative policy rates by the European Central Bank in mid-2014 leads to more risk taking and less lending by euro-area banks with greater reliance on deposit funding. Our results suggest that negative rates are less accommodative, and could pose a risk to financial stability, if lending is done by high-deposit banks.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 15 June 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2157Details
- Abstract
- How sizable is the wealth effect on consumption in euro area countries? To address this question, we use newly available harmonized euro area wealth data and the methodology in Carroll et al. (2011b). We find that the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth averaged across the largest euro area economies is around 3 cents per euro, with a marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth significantly larger than of housing wealth. Country-group estimates document no significant differences between the largest economies and the rest of the sample. In contrast, remarkable differences emerge between periphery and core countries.
- JEL Code
- C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
E21 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Consumption, Saving, Wealth
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 5 June 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2155Details
- Abstract
- How to conduct macro-prudential regulation? How to coordinate monetary policy and macro-prudential policy? To address these questions, I develop a continuous-time New Keynesian economy in which a financial intermediary sector is subject to a leverage constraint. Coordination between monetary and macro-prudential policies helps to reduce the risk of entering into a financial crisis and speeds up exit from the crisis. The downside of coordination is variability in inflation and in the employment gap.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 31 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2125Details
- Abstract
- Large-scale asset programmes aim to impact the real economy through the financial system. The ECB has focused much of its policies on safe assets. An intended channel of transmission of this type of programme is the “portfolio rebalancing channel”, whereby investors are influenced to shift their investments away from such safe assets towards assets with higher expected returns, including lending to households and firms. We examine the portfolio rebalancing channel around the ECB’s asset purchase program (APP). We exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in the impact of APP on the valuation of the financial portfolio held by different sectors of the European economy. Overall, our results provide evidence of an active portfolio rebalancing channel. In more vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances and relatively high risk premia remain, APP was mostly reflected into a rebalancing towards riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, where constraints on loan demand and supply are less significant, the rebalancing was observed mostly in terms of bank loans. Examining large European banks, we confirm similar geographical differences.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 15 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2123Details
- Abstract
- This paper introduces a new comprehensive data set on policies of a macroprudential nature in the banking sectors of the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) between 1995 and 2014. The Macroprudential Policies Evaluation Database (MaPPED) offers a detailed overview of the “life-cycle” of policy instruments which are either genuinely macroprudential or are essentially microprudential but likely to have a significant impact on the whole banking system. It tracks events of the introduction, recalibration and termination of eleven categories and 53 subcategories of instruments. MaPPED has been based on a carefully designed questionnaire, which has been completed in cooperation with experts from national central banks and supervisory authorities of all EU member states. This paper describes the design and structure of the new data set and presents the first descriptive analysis of the use of policy measures with a macroprudential nature in the EU over the last two decades. The results indicate that there has been a remarkable variation in the use of policies of a macroprudential nature both across EU countries and over time. Moreover, the analysis provides some tentative evidence of an impact of capital buffers, lending restrictions and caps on maturity mismatches on credit to the non-financial private sector in the EU as well as of the relative ineffectiveness of sectoral risk weights in controlling credit growth.
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E60 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 8 September 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2098Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of increasingly negative central bank policy rates on banks’ propensity to become undercapitalized in a financial crisis (‘SRisk’). We find that the risk impact of negative rates is moderate, and depends on banks’ business models: Banks with diversified income streams are perceived by the market as less risky, while banks that rely predominantly on deposit funding are perceived as more risky. Policy rate cuts below zero trigger different SRisk responses than an earlier cut to zero.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 29 June 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2084Details
- Abstract
- We propose a novel observation-driven finite mixture model for the study of banking data. The model accommodates time-varying component means and covariance matrices, normal and Student’s t distributed mixtures, and economic determinants of time-varying parameters. Monte Carlo experiments suggest that units of interest can be classified reliably into distinct components in a variety of settings. In an empirical study of 208 European banks between 2008Q1–2015Q4, we identify six business model components and discuss how their properties evolve over time. Changes in the yield curve predict changes in average business model characteristics.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
Short articles
- 24 June 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 97Details
- Abstract
- Throughout the world, the global financial crisis fostered the design and adoption of macroprudential policies to safeguard the financial system. This raises important questions for monetary policy, which, by contrast, primarily focuses on maintaining price stability. What, if any, is the relationship between (conventional) monetary policy and macroprudential policy? In particular, how does the effectiveness of macroprudential policies influence the conduct of monetary policy? This article reviews recent theoretical and empirical research addressing these questions. The main conclusion is that monetary policy can also perform macroprudential functions, but it does so by deviating from its focus on price stability. The quantification of this trade-off remains an exciting question.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 24 February 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 92Details
- Abstract
- There are always trade-offs to weigh up when taking monetary and macroprudential policy actions. Thechoice is between supporting the economy by ensuring a smooth supply of credit at favourableconditions, on the one hand, and containing financial stability risks, on the other hand. There are alsosignificant spillovers between the two policies since they are both implemented and transmitted throughthe financial system. Monetary and macroprudential authorities need to take these interactions intoaccount when deciding on interventions. Indeed, there are clear advantages of accounting for financialstability considerations when taking monetary policy decisions and limiting the constraints on the practicalimplementation of macroprudential policy.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 8 December 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 90Details
- Abstract
- The natural rate of interest is the equilibrium real interest rate that is consistent with inflation on target andproduction at full capacity. This article argues that in economies with low natural rates, such as the euroarea today, macroprudential policy can have benefits for the effectiveness of conventional monetarypolicy, in addition to safeguarding financial stability. Notably, macroprudential policies that curb leverageof financial intermediaries during upturns can also help stimulate aggregate demand during downturns.One way they do so is by containing systemic risk in financial markets. As a by-product of the systemicrisk reduction, intermediary financing and aggregate output also become more stable. This additionalreduction in risk boosts the natural rate and thus reduces the likelihood of hitting the effective lower bound(ELB) on policy rates. In numerical simulations conducted for the euro area, the positive effect ofmacroprudential policy on the average natural rate is estimated to be around 0.7%, while the probability ofhitting the ELB declines by around 8%, relative to a benchmark scenario without macroprudential policy.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 14 October 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 88Details
- Abstract
- Policy rates in advanced economies are unusually low. What effect does this have on bank stability? I identify two competing effects. On the one hand, low rates harm bank profits by squeezing interest margins. On the other hand, they boost the value of long-term assets held by banks. Using a standard banking model, I determine the policy rate level at which these two forces cancel each other out, i.e. the tipping point. Past this tipping point, the net effect of low rates on bank capital is negative. Applying the model to the US economy, I quantify the tipping point in August 2007 as a policy rate of 0.55%.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 September 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 87.3Details
- Abstract
- Many countries have implemented macroprudential policies. The aims are twofold: first, to render the financial system more resilient to shocks and, second, to prevent booms and busts in the financial system in response to economic cycles. This article provides theoretical and empirical evidence which shows the positive impact that these measures have on financial stability, as well as the gains in economic growth derived from a stronger financial system.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 September 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 87.2Details
- Abstract
- The effect of policy rate cuts on bank lending and risk-taking depends on how the low interest rate environment affects banks’ ability to raise external financing. When interest rates are low, easing monetary policy relaxes banks’ external financing constraint less than when interest rates are high. This reduces the stimulus to bank lending and induces banks to take more risk. There are indeed side effects of monetary stimulus at the zero-lower bound (ZLB).
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 September 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 87.1Details
- Abstract
- When considering the use of macroprudential instruments to manage financial imbalances, macroprudential policymakers face an intertemporal trade-off between facilitating short-term expected growth and containing medium-term downside risks to the economy. To assist policymakers in assessing this trade-off, in this article we propose a risk management framework which extends the well-known notion of growth-at-risk to consider the entire predictive real GDP growth distribution, with a view to quantifying the macroprudential policy stance. A novel empirical model fitted to euro area data allows us to study direct and indirect interactions between financial vulnerabilities, financial stress and real GDP growth, incorporating non-linear amplification effects among all variables. Our framework can support policymakers by facilitating model-based macro-financial stress tests and model-based assessments of when to adjust macroprudential instruments.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 18 March 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 82Details
- Abstract
- Many central bank measures implemented in past years – most recently the additional longer-term refinancing operations launched by the Eurosystem at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic – aimed inter alia at safeguarding money market conditions. This is because smoothly functioning money markets are key for the transmission of monetary policy to credit conditions in the economy. In this article we look at money market conditions in the euro area over the past 15 years and discuss the interactions between money markets, central bank policies and new Basel III regulations.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 25 February 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 81Details
- Abstract
- Loan renegotiations are expected to surge following the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak and the subsequent crisis, as more loans default during recessions. At such times, managing lending relationships effectively becomes even more important for bank governance, risk, and credit supply. My study presents evidence that continuous lending relationships between bank loan officers and corporate borrowers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiations. The analysis draws on a novel dataset on corporate loans during a bank reorganisation in Greece in the mid-2010s. This dataset allows us to empirically identify the causal effect of interrupted relationships. My main findings are that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship are faced with three consequences. First, the firms are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms with continuous relationships. Second, when loans are renegotiated, firms with interrupted loan officer relationships receive tougher loan terms. Third, these firms raise more equity, reduce their overall borrowing, and partially substitute borrowing from other banks. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers renegotiating loans. It therefore suggests that bank managers, supervisors, and resolution authorities need to be mindful of the potential costs of changing loan officers.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 27 January 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 80Details
- Abstract
- Episodes such as the current coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis might lead to a significant rise in borrower defaults and, consequently, weakness in the banking sector. Having well-capitalised banks makes the financial system more resilient to such episodes. We assess how much capital would be optimal for banks to hold, taking into consideration the risk of banking crises driven by borrower defaults (which we term “twin default crises”).
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 21 April 2020
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 70Details
- Abstract
- How do systemic banks in the euro area react to negative central bank interest rates? This article suggests that they do not generally pass negative rates on to their depositors, and that they search for yield by investing in riskier securities. Their investments are directed more towards securities issued by the private sector and denominated in dollars – in addition to euro.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 15 April 2020
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 69Details
- Abstract
- How does the presence of “shadow banks” – non-bank, unregulated financial intermediaries – affect the ability of central banks to tackle a liquidity crisis? To address this question, we develop an asset pricing model with both bank and non-bank financial institutions. A crucial part of the model is that banks intermediate liquidity between the central bank and non-banks, but this intermediation stops during a financial crisis. Non-banks are then left without a lender-of-last-resort, and central bank liquidity operations with banks are not sufficient to mitigate the crisis. In our stylized model, opening liquidity facilities to non-banks and purchasing illiquid assets are then essential measures to tackle a liquidity crisis.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 26 September 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 62Details
- Abstract
- This article studies this question by revisiting the Eurosystem's experience during the euro area sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. In some instances, the Eurosystem was able to remove excess risk from parts of its balance sheet by extending the scale of its operations, in line with Bagehot's well-known assertion that occasionally "the brave plan is the safe plan."
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 16 July 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 60Details
- Abstract
- The effects of interest rate surprises on banks are different when nominal interest rates are very low. In “normal” times, policy rate announcements that are below market expectations tend to boost banks’ stock prices on average. When interest rates are very low, however, there is a reversal of this effect: at such times, negative rate surprises reduce banks’ stock prices. This negative impact is larger for banks whose funding relies more on retail deposits than on other sources of funding.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 23 May 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 58Details
- Abstract
- What role does prudential regulation play in the prevention of banking crises? Before the financial crisis there were important national differences in the implementation of the EU framework for capital regulation. This article suggests that these differences had important implications for the resilience of banks during the crisis and that, generally, banks that were subject to less stringent prudential regulation before the crisis were more likely to require some form of public support when the crisis came.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 30 April 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 57Details
- Abstract
- Money markets are an important source of short-term funding for banks, which rely heavily on them to cover their liquidity needs. But when money markets do not function smoothly, banks may have to de-leverage or increase their holdings of liquid assets, leading to a decline in lending and output. This decline can be mitigated by central banks if they increase the size of their balance sheets.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 26 March 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 56Details
- Abstract
- Should monetary policy be concerned with financial stability? Or do financial supervisory and regulatory policies suffice to achieve this goal? These questions have been prominent in the policy debate since the global financial crisis. To address them, I develop a tractable monetary model in which systemic risk and economic activity both depend on financial conditions. I show that there are benefits from using monetary policy, i.e., interest-rate policies, to enhance financial stability. These benefits are quantitatively moderate, however, and partly offset by costs in terms of inflation variability.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 February 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 55Details
- Abstract
- Challenging conventional wisdom, recent research shows that, collectively, euro area banks have limited exposure to interest rate risk, but that their individual exposures vary significantly from institution to institution. Differences in interest-rate setting conventions for loan contracts, especially mortgages, across euro area countries have been shown to be an important driver of this heterogeneity. This heterogeneity remains pronounced even after taking into account hedging activity in derivatives markets, suggesting that monetary policy may be transmitted through different channels in different parts of the euro area.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 29 January 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 54Details
- Abstract
- “Quantitative easing” refers to central bank purchases of assets such as stocks and bonds to increase the money supply when interest rates are too low for conventional rate cuts to provide further policy accommodation. Quantitative easing in the euro area through the ECB’s asset purchase programme (APP) has stimulated economic activity and asset prices, affecting income and wealth inequality among households. It has decreased income inequality, mostly by reducing the unemployment rate for poorer households, but also, to a lesser extent, by increasing the wages of the employed. Quantitative easing has also helped to reduce net wealth inequality slightly through its positive impact on house prices.
- JEL Code
- D31 : Microeconomics→Distribution→Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 13 February 2018
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 43Details
- Abstract
- This article shows how the pass-through of negative policy rates via bank lending depends on a bank’s funding structure. When policy rates enter negative territory, high-deposit banks increase risk-taking but reduce lending in the syndicated loan market relative to low-deposit banks. The increase in risk-taking reduces financial constraints for higher risk firms.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)