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Katrin Assenmacher
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Division
Stress Test Modelling
- Current Position
-
Head of Division
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2018-2023
Member, ECB Working Paper Editorial Board
- 2012-2016
Research Advisory Committee, Czech National Bank
- Education
- 1992-1997
PhD in Economics, University of Bonn, Germany
- 1987-1992
MA in Economics, University of Bonn, Germany
- Professional experience
- 2024
Head of Division - Stress Test Modelling Division, Directorate Macroprudential Policy & Financial Stability, European Central Bank
- 2016-2023
Head of Division - Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Monetary Policy, European Central Bank
- 2010-2016
Head of Division - Monetary Policy Analysis Division, Swiss National Bank, Zurich
- 2004-2010
Economist - Research Division, Swiss National Bank, Zurich
- 1997-2004
Assistant Professor - University of Bonn, Germany
- Teaching experience
- 2007-2016
Empirical Models in Monetary Policy - University of Zurich, Switzerland
- 2009-2009
Inflation Forecasting with Time Series Models - Central Banker's Course, Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland
- 2007-2008
Introduction to Macroeconomics - University of Bern, Switzerland
- 2001-2002
Advanced Macroeconomics - University of Bonn, Germany
- 13 February 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2907Details
- Abstract
- We develop a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions to study the transition from a steady-state without CBDC to one in which the home country issues a CBDC. The CBDC provides households with a liquid, convenient and storage-cost free means of payments which reduces the market power of banks on deposits. In the steady-state CBDC unambiguously improves welfare without disintermediating the banking sector. But macroeconomic volatility in the transition period to the new steady-state increases for plausible values of the latter. Demand for CBDC and money overshoot, thereby crowding out bank deposits and leading to initial declines in investment, consumption and output. We use non-linear solution methods with occasionally binding constraints to explore how alternative policies reduce volatility in the transition, contrasting the effects of restrictions on non-residents, binding caps, tiered remuneration and central bank asset purchases. Binding caps reduce disintermediation and output losses in the transition most effectively, with an optimal level of around 40% of steady-state CBDC demand.
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
- 8 May 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2811Details
- Abstract
- To study implications of an interest-bearing CBDC on the economy, we integrate a New Monetarist-type decentralised market that explicitly accounts for the means-of-exchange function of bank deposits and CBDC into a New Keynesian model with financial frictions. The central bank influences the store-of-value function of money through a conventional Taylor rule while it affects the means-of-exchange function of money through CBDC operations. Peak responses to monetary policy shocks remain similar in the presence of an interest-bearing CBDC, implying that monetary transmission is not impaired. At the same time however, the provision of CBDC helps smooth responses to macroeconomic shocks. By supplying CBDC, the central bank contributes to stabilising the liquidity premium, thereby affecting bank funding conditions and the opportunity costs of money, which dampens and smoothes the reaction of investment and consumption to macroeconomic shocks.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 31 October 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 100Details
- Abstract
- Central banks around the world are exploring the case for central bank digital currency (CBDC) – essentially a digital version of cash. In this article, we provide an overview of the economics of CBDC (Ahnert et al., 2022a). First, we outline the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and motivate the current debate. We then look at the implications for monetary policy and financial stability before discussing policy issues and challenges. Finally, we highlight several areas where our understanding of digital money could be improved by further research.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2713Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides a structured overview of the burgeoning literature on the economics of CBDC. We document the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and review motives for the issuance of CBDC. We then study the implications for the financial system and discuss of a number of policy issues and challenges. While the academic literature broadly echoes policy makers’ concerns about bank disintermediation and financial stability risks, it also provides conditions under which such adverse effects may not materialize. We also point to several knowledge gaps that merit further work, including data privacy and the study of end‐user preferences for attributes of digital payment methods.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Discussion papers
- 16 August 2022
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 20Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides a structured overview of the burgeoning literature on the economics of CBDC. We document the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and review motives for the issuance of CBDC. We then study the implications for the financial system and discuss of a number of policy issues and challenges. While the academic literature broadly echoes policy makers’ concerns about bank disintermediation and financial stability risks, it also provides conditions under which such adverse effects may not materialize. We also point to several knowledge gaps that merit further work, including data privacy and the study of end‐user preferences for attributes of digital payment methods.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 12 May 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 293Details
- Abstract
- In July 2021 the Eurosystem decided to launch the investigation phase of the digital euro project, which aims to provide euro area citizens with access to central bank money in an increasingly digitalised world. While a digital euro could offer a wide range of benefits, it could prompt changes in the demand for bank deposits and services from private financial entities (ECB, 2020a), with knock-on consequences for bank lending and resilience. By inducing bank disintermediation, a central bank digital currency, or CBDC, could in principle alter the transmission of monetary policy and impact financial stability. To prevent this risk, options to moderate CBDC take-up are being discussed widely.In view of the significant degree of uncertainty surrounding the design of a potential digital euro, its demand and the prevailing environment in which it would be introduced, this paper explores a set of analytical exercises that can offer insights into the consequences it could have for bank intermediation in the euro area.Based on assumptions about the degree of substitution between different forms of money in normal times, several take-up scenarios are calculated to illustrate how the potential demand for a digital euro might shape up. The paper then analyses the mechanisms through which commercial banks and the central bank could react to the introduction of a digital euro. Overall, effects on bank intermediation are found to vary across credit institutions in normal times and to be potentially larger in stressed times. Further, a potential digital euro’s capacity to alter system-wide bank run dynamics appears to depend on a few crucial factors, such as CBDC remuneration and usage limits.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 274Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 30 July 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2578Details
- Abstract
- We study the macroeconomic effects of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Timing and information frictions create a need for inside (bank deposits) and outside money (CBDC) to finance production. To steer the quantity of CBDC, the central bank can set the lending and deposit rates for CBDC as well as collateral and quantity requirements. Less restrictive provision of CBDC reduces bank deposits. A positive interest spread on CBDC or stricter collateral or quantity constraints reduce welfare but can contain bank disintermediation, especially if the elasticity of substitution between bank deposits and CBDC is small.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 14 January 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2365Details
- Abstract
- Extending the data set used in Beyer (2009) from 2007 to 2017, we estimate I(1) and I(2) money demand models for euro area M3. We find that the elasticities in the money demand and the real wealth relations identified previously in Beyer (2009) have remained remarkably stable throughout the extended sample period, once only a few additional deterministic variables in the long run relationships for the period after the start of the global financial crisis and the ECB’s non- standard monetary policy measures are included. Testing for price homogeneity in the I(2) model we find that the nominal-to-real transformation is not rejected for the money relation whereas the wealth relation cannot be expressed in real terms.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
- 23 December 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 976Details
- Abstract
- This paper tests the expectations hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of interest rates in US data, using spectral regression techniques that allow us to consider different frequency bands. We find a positive relation between the term spread and the change in the long-term interest rate in a frequency band of 6 months to 4 years, whereas the relation is negative at higher and lower frequencies. We confirm that the variance of term premia relative to expected changes in long-term interest rates dominates at high and low frequencies, leading the EH to be rejected in those bands but not in the intermediate frequency band.
- JEL Code
- C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects - Network
- ECB workshop on the analysis of the money market
- 2021
- International Journal of Central BankingMonetary Policy with Negative Interest Rates: De-linking Cash from Digital Money
- 2018
- Credit and Capital Markets
- 2017
- Gürkaynak, R. and Tille, C. (eds), DSGE Models in the Conduct of Policy: Use as IntendedBridging the gap between structural VAR and DSGE models
- 2017
- Journal of Applied Econometrics
- 2017
- Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.), War on Cash: Is there a Future for Cash?
- 2013
- Di Mauro, F. and Pesaran, M.H. (eds.), The GVAR Handbook: Structure and Applications of a Macro Model of the Global Economy for Policy AnalysisForecasting the Swiss Economy with a Small GVAR Model
- 2013
- Oesterreichische Nationalbank (ed.), 41st Economics Conference 2013: A Changing Role for Central Banks
- 2010
- Applied Economics
- 2010
- Economic Policy
- 2008
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- 2008
- Swiss Journal of Economics and Statitsics
- 2008
- Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- 2008
- European Economic Review
- 2008
- National Institute Economic Review
- 2008
- Felton, A. and Reinhart, C.M. (eds.), The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st CenturyCan Monetary Policy Really Be Used to Stabilize Asset Prices?
- 2007
- Cobham, D. (ed.), The Travails of the EurozoneUnderstanding the Link between Money Growth and Inflation in the Euro Area
- 2007
- Michler, A. and Thieme, H.J. (eds), Systeme monetärer Steuerung: Analyse und Vergleich geldpolitischer Strategien, Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der WirtschaftDeterminanten der Geldnachfrage in der Euro-Zone
- 2007
- Journal of the European Economic Associaition
- 2006
- European Economic Review
- 2003
- Economic Inquiry
- 1998
- Physica-Verlag, HeidelbergDie Geldnachfrage in Europa: Aggregationsprobleme und Empirie
- 1997
- Open Economies Review