

# Discussion of McKay and Wolf “What Can Time-Series Regressions Tell Us About Policy Counterfactuals”

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# Approaches to the Lucas Critique

**The Lucas (1976) Critique:** We cannot use historical relationships to draw reliable conclusions about the effects of a shock under any other policy rule than that which held historically.

- ▶ Cannot draw policy conclusions from semi-structural models, since agents' behaviour would differ under alternative policy
- ① **Lucas Program:** Micro-founded structural models that match key moments in the data
- ② **Sims & Zha:** Impose counterfactual rules in semi-structural model *ex post* (e.g., “zeroing out”)

# Main idea

- Agents learn about policy rules and update expectations *ex ante*: need to account for changes in expectations.
- Use not only contemporaneous shocks, but a full menu of news shocks to impose the policy rule **in expectation**.
- Given contemporary shocks  $\nu_{0,t}$  and news shocks  $\nu_{l,t-l}, \forall l = 1, \dots, \infty$ , can impose any policy rule.
- Use the impulse responses to such shocks to infer impulse responses to a non-policy shock under some counterfactual rule.

# Simple example: three-equation NK model

$$y_t = y_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\gamma} (i_t - \pi_{t+1})$$

$$\pi_t = \kappa y_t + \beta \pi_{t+1} + (\varepsilon_t + \theta \varepsilon_{t-1})$$

$$i_t = \phi \pi_t + \nu_{0,t} + \sum_{l=1}^{\infty} \nu_{l,t-l}$$

$$i_t = \tilde{\phi} \pi_t \quad (\text{counterfactual rule})$$

Solve system of 2 eqns (2 horizons) for  $\tilde{\nu}_{0,0}, \tilde{\nu}_{1,0}$ :

$$\underbrace{i_\phi(\varepsilon_0) + \Theta_{i,\nu 0,\phi} \tilde{\nu}_{0,0} + \Theta_{i,\nu 1,\phi} \tilde{\nu}_{1,0}}_{\text{IR of } i \text{ to } \varepsilon_0, \tilde{\nu}_{0,0}, \tilde{\nu}_{1,0}} = \tilde{\phi} \times \underbrace{[\pi_\phi(\varepsilon_0) + \Theta_{\pi,\nu 0,\phi} \tilde{\nu}_{0,0} + \Theta_{\pi,\nu 1,\phi} \tilde{\nu}_{1,0}]}_{\text{IR of } \pi \text{ to } \varepsilon_0, \tilde{\nu}_{0,0}, \tilde{\nu}_{1,0}}$$

counterfactual rule

## General theory

Two key assumptions on setting:

- 1 Linear DGP
- 2 Policy only affects private behaviour through instrument

**Main result (Proposition 1):** If invertibility holds historically and under the counterfactual, we can recover the counterfactual IRs of observables and the policy instrument:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_x [\mathbf{x}_A(\varepsilon) + \Theta_{x,\nu,A} \times \tilde{\nu}] + \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_z [\mathbf{z}_A(\varepsilon) + \Theta_{z,\nu,A} \times \tilde{\nu}] &= \mathbf{0}, \\ \text{(counterfactual policy rule)} \quad \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_x \mathbf{x} + \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_z \mathbf{z} &= \mathbf{0}. \end{aligned}$$

Best to think about the results as applying to perturbations of policy, not equilibrium/steady state shifts.

Also no asymmetric information (more on this later).

# Shocks, not news shocks

The demands of the preceding slides look challenging!

- ① Need news shocks for the policy instrument
- ② Need news shocks at up to  $T$  horizons

**Key point:** In practice, the shocks do not need to be news shocks, can just be linearly independent measurements of the contemporaneous shock.

In practice, will not have  $T$  shock series, but will approximate using  $n_s$  shocks.

## Reframing as an IRF matching exercise

The paper focuses on a sequence of news shocks for theoretical motivation, and having an adequate menu of shocks to impose (or approximate) a rule.

Completely equivalent to focus instead on impulse responses: find the linear combination of baseline IRs that comes closest to aligning the IRs under the counterfactual rule:

$$\min_{\mathbf{s}} \|\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{x}_{\mathcal{A}}(\varepsilon) + \Omega_{\mathbf{x},\mathcal{A}} \times \mathbf{s}) + \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z}_{\mathcal{A}}(\varepsilon) + \Omega_{\mathbf{z},\mathcal{A}} \times \mathbf{s})\| \quad (\text{OBJ})$$

## Regression in IR space

This problem constitutes a **Regression in Impulse Response Space**, see [Barnichon and Mesters \(2020\)](#), [Lewis and Mertens \(2022\)](#). Treat horizons as “observations”, and regress a set of IRs on another.

(OBJ) is equivalent to estimating the OLS regression.

$$\begin{aligned} (\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_x x_{\mathcal{A}}^h(\varepsilon) + \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_z z_{\mathcal{A}}^h(\varepsilon)) &= - (\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_x \Omega_{x,\mathcal{A}}^h + \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_z \Omega_{z,\mathcal{A}}^h) \times \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{u}_{IR}^h, \\ &h = 0, \dots, T - 1, \end{aligned}$$

where the shock/weight  $n_s$ -vector  $\mathbf{s}$  is the “coefficient” vector. Problem is similar to [Lewis and Mertens \(2022\)](#).



# Implications

Math will be a little different, but

- ① **Identification:** Works with either external or internal instruments
- ② **Inference:** (robust) frequentist methods available
- ③ **Weighting:** Does it make sense to equally weight all horizons, or improve efficiency?
- ④ **Approximation error:** Intuitive units for approximation error available by recasting as “ $R^2$ ”?
- ⑤ **Horizons:** Does it make sense to include all horizons up to  $T - 1$ ?

## Useful applications?

The most obvious cases for application are monetary and fiscal policy rules (see paper and Valerie Ramey's NBER discussion).

- Potential to be extremely useful, particularly in policy institutions (see paper's MP rules)
- Which applications are accessible depends on how many shock series really needed in practice: many available for MP, fewer for fiscal.
- How linearly dependent are the available shocks?
- A well-scaled measure of error would help interpret and compare applications.
- How much does *historical* variation in policy rules matter?

# Which shocks?

- Conceptual challenge: many simultaneously valid MP shock series (Sims-Rudebusch)?
- Should really use internally consistent multi-dimensional series like Swanson (2021).
- Central bank information effect presents a big challenge, since it violates key assumption on the effects on policy (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) shocks).
- [Lewis \(2022\)](#) and [Jarocinski \(2022\)](#) separate info shocks from the three dimensions Swanson identifies.

# Conclusion

- Very helpful answer to Lucas critique without a structural model for policy perturbations!
- Information requirements not as demanding as at first glance - but more work needed to assess approximations.
- The approximation step reduces to an OLS problem, with benefits!
- Need to think carefully about which shocks to use.