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**BANKS AND THE
MACROECONOMIC
TRANSMISSION OF
INTEREST-RATE RISK**



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM

Banks and the Macroeconomic Transmission of Interest-Rate Risk

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
Motivation

Recent **monetary tightening** revealed significant exposure of US banks to interest-rate risk (IRR)

- ▶ balance-sheet losses, bank failures, credit slowdown

Balance-sheets increasingly sensitive to interest-rate changes

- ▶ average **duration gap** raised steadily over last decade



What are the **implications** and **drivers** of banks' IRR exposures?
How does bank regulation affect incentives to take-on IRR?

Data

Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports):

- ▶ assets and liabilities by maturity, m_j , between 1997-2022

$$\text{Duration Gap}_{i,t} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}} m_j \frac{\text{Asset}_{j,i,t}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}} \text{Asset}_{j,i,t}} - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{L}} m_j \frac{\text{Liabilities}_{j,i,t}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{L}} \text{Liabilities}_{j,i,t}}$$

FR-Y-9C (BHC quarterly filings) merged to CRSP

Monetary policy shocks


- ▶ series from Bu et al. 2021 and Nakamura-Steinsson 2014

Duration and Interests Rates

Impulse response of duration gaps to monetary policy shocks

- ▶ estimate average and heterogenous effects w.r.t leverage

$$\Delta \log \text{Duration Gap}_{i,t+h} = \beta_0^h \Delta R_t + \beta_1^h (l_{i,t-1} - E_i[l_{i,t}]) \Delta R_t + \Gamma_1^h \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i^h + \epsilon_{i,t}$$



Fact 1 – Surprise interest-rate cut increases duration gaps

Fact 2 – More leveraged banks less responsive

Model

GE model with **endogenous interest-rate-risk exposure**

A continuum of banks

- ▶ invest in **short- and long-duration assets**
- ▶ face **financial frictions** (no-equity issuance + default risk)
- ▶ are heterogenous due to **idiosyncratic risk**

Bank net worth

$$n = \left[\underbrace{R^K}_{\text{int. rate insensitive}} - \underbrace{h \left(\frac{k^l}{k^s + k^l} \right)}_{\text{holding cost}} + \underbrace{(1 - \delta) \omega \frac{k^l}{k^s + k^l}}_{\text{int. rate sensitive}} \underbrace{Q(\mathbf{S})}_{\text{asset price}} \right] (k^s + k^l) - \underbrace{b}_{\text{debt}}$$

- ▶ asset price fluctuates with level of interest rate
- ▶ portfolio share governs interest-rate-risk exposure

Optimal portfolio share given by

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\omega', \mathbf{S}' | \mathbf{S}} [(1 - \delta) \omega' Q(\mathbf{S}')] + \frac{\text{Cov}((1 - \delta) \omega' Q(\mathbf{S}'), \iota(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}')) (1 + \lambda(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}'))}{\mathbb{E}_{\omega', \mathbf{S}' | \mathbf{S}} [\iota(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}')) (1 + \lambda(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}'))]}_{\text{expected asset value}} \approx \underbrace{h'}_{\text{risk-premium (<0)}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{k^l}{k^s + k^l} \right)}_{\text{marginal cost}}$$

- ▶ $\iota(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}')$: repayment indicator; $\lambda(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{S}')$: shadow value of net worth

Testable implications


Aggregate: low interest rate → high long-term asset share

- ▶ banks experience capital gains, lower risk premium
- ▶ expect high asset value next period (if shock persistent)

Cross-section: low leverage → high long-term asset share

- ▶ low-leverage banks less constrained, lower risk-premium

Duration and Leverage



Fact 3 - Less leveraged banks have higher duration gaps


Aggregate Implications

Calibrate model to fit aggregate and cross-sectional banking moments, then feed with sequence of interest rates from data starting in 2003

- ▶ reproduce **untargeted increase in banks' duration gaps** prior to tightening
- ▶ generate **asset-price contraction** in line with empirical counterpart

What is the role of **endogenous duration adjustments** for macro dynamics?

- ▶ compute counterfactual where long-term-asset share kept constant
- ▶ account for **30% of asset-price decline** and **40% of equity losses**



Policy Counterfactuals

Model features inefficiencies:

- ▶ pecuniary externality + deposit insurance

Use model to conduct two policy counterfactuals

Short-term liquidity requirement

$$\frac{k^l}{k^s + k^l} \leq \theta$$

- ▶ limit ability of banks to invest in long-term assets
- ▶ effective in mitigating effects of interest-rate hike

Leverage requirement

$$b' \leq \xi (k^s + k^l)$$

- ▶ limit ability of banks to leverage
- ▶ worsens impact of tightening by redistributing risk

Heterogenous effects important to understand aggregate impact of policies

