

Discussion of “Financial Conditions and  
Density Forecasts for US Output and Inflation”  
by Piergiorgio Alessandri (Bank of Italy)  
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## Questions from the paper

- ▶ Do financial conditions (measured by fci) improve forecast accuracy for US inflation, output (and other variables)?
- ▶ Do threshold VARs perform better?
- ▶ Did financial conditions provide a “credible warning” (in real time) of Great Recession? Raising normative issues ...

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- ▶ Did financial conditions provide a “credible warning” (in real time) of Great Recession? Raising normative issues ...
- ▶ Main results: Yes, Yes and Yes (please, next time policymakers)

## Some questions of interest (to me)

- ▶ Can log score based evaluations of forecast densities mask predictive content?
- ▶ What additional steps—beyond log scores—might be useful to analyse forecast performance?
- ▶ What characteristics do policymakers want from a forecast when seeking advanced warnings?


## An example to illustrate some issues

- ▶ “Experts”, Great Depression era, and Bretton Woods era, plus a few friends; each uses a bivariate VAR in inflation and output estimated on data only from relevant era
- ▶ Then, look at a bake-off between the two experts through Great Recession, and consider RMSFE, log scores
- ▶ In this example, despite a strong log score performance, the policymaker wouldn't want to bring back a defunct Great Depression expert to call the slump ...

TABLE 4: LOG SCORES RELATIVE TO GREAT MODERATION EXPERT

	2005Q1-2010Q4	2005Q1-06Q4	2007Q1-08Q4	2009Q1-10Q4
(a) Output Growth				
Gold Standard	0.736*	0.833	0.600	0.841
Great Depression	0.723*	0.829	0.576	0.832
Bretton Woods	0.839*	0.872	0.770	0.907
Great Inflation	0.855*	0.903	0.743	0.973
Great Moderation	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Linear Opinion Pool	0.726*	0.827	0.585	0.831

FIGURE 3: OUTPUT GROWTH FORECAST DENSITIES 2008Q4



Notes: The vertical dashed lines indicate the location of the realization in 2008Q4 and the vertical dotted lines indicate the means of the forecast densities.


# Cost-loss approach with negative output growth events

- ▶ Following eg Granger and Pesaran (2000), Berrocal et al (2010), relative cost of unanticipated contraction  $R = C/L$ ,  $0 < R < 1$ , unknown
- ▶ Issue contraction warning only if  $Pr(\Delta y < 0) > R$
- ▶ Define  $TEL = n_{10}L + (n_{01} + n_{00})C$

<b>Event Forecast</b>	<b>Event Observed</b>	
	Yes	No
Yes	$n_{00}$	$n_{01}$
No	$n_{10}$	$n_{11}$



FIGURE 7: ECONOMIC LOSS RELATIVE TO GREAT MODERATION EXPERT



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- ▶ Can log score based evaluations of forecast densities mask predictive content?
- ▶ Yep. Strong relative log scores differentials aren't sufficient to indicate that the policymaker can use the model (expert) in real time to give an early warning indicator

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  2. Analyse the PITS to check calibration; eg Diebold-Gunther-Tay (1998), Jore-Mitchell-Vahey (2010)
  3. Plot forecast densities and check out the shape (various moments could be “post-processed”)

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- ▶ What characteristics do policymakers want from a forecast when seeking advanced warnings?
- ▶ Utilise loss function, Granger-Pesaran (2000a, 2000b), Coe-Vahey (2014)
- ▶ With unknown loss function, need to check out calibration (reliability), as noted by Jore-Mitchell-Vahey (2010), plus resolution vNorden-Galbraith (2008) and/or sharpness

- ▶ An interesting paper and an important issue
- ▶ Perhaps a little more to do in describing and understanding the differences in forecast performance

# Surely, density forecasting and loss-based evaluation is a promising route to deal with the quacks ...?

- ▶ John Kay (FT, September 21 2010):

“There will always be a demand for forecasts, so there will always be a supply. But the reputation of economic forecasters, like other quacks and charlatans, depends more on the slickness of their presentations than the value of their work”